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Abstract
This paper presents experimental evidence that tax compliance is path dependent. We
show that individuals faced with the same current tax enforcement parameters, will never-
theless choose diﬀerent compliance if they have faced diﬀerent tax enforcement parameters
in the past. This ﬁnding has important policy implications. For instance, legal harmo-
nization in the EU cannot be expected to reliably yield similar behavior in countries with
diﬀerent legal histories.
Keywords: tax compliance, path dependence, experiment
JEL-Classiﬁcation: C91, H26, K42
∗We would like to thank Kate Bendrick, Gerald Eisenkopf, Urs Fischbacher, Simeon Schudy, Pascal Sulser,
Verena Utikal, Irenaeus Wolﬀ, and Natalie Zimmer for very helpful suggestions.
†University of Konstanz, Department of Economics, Box 131, 78457 Konstanz, Germany. E-mail:
lisa.bruttel@uni-konstanz.de. Phone: 0049-7531-88-3214. Fax: 0049-7531-88-2145.
‡University of Konstanz, Department of Economics, Box 136, 78457 Konstanz, Germany. E-mail:
tim.friehe@uni-konstanz.de. Phone: 0049-7531-88-2534. Fax: 0049-7531-88-4135.
11 Introduction
The design of mechanisms to steer private decision-making in desired directions is an important
aspect of public economics. The policy designer predicts how diﬀerent institutions inﬂuence
individual decision-making by considering their impact on individual payoﬀs. For instance,
because governments need to raise funds to ﬁnance public goods, increasing the expected costs
of tax evasion by raising the audit probability may be viewed as a good policy if seeking to
increase tax declarations (e.g., Allingham and Sandmo 1972).
This paper argues that there are circumstances in which this focus on individual payoﬀs is
not suﬃcient for deriving optimal institutions. In a tax-compliance setup, we establish that
factors which inﬂuenced beneﬁts and costs in the past still bear importance for tax compliance
in the present, although beneﬁts and costs in the present are no longer aﬀected by these factors.
Stated diﬀerently, if individual A and individual B have faced dissimilar institutions in the past,
they may behave diﬀerently now even though their expected beneﬁts and costs are the same.
Given the diﬃculty of obtaining appropriate ﬁeld data to study path dependence, we make use
of an experiment to establish our ﬁndings. The tax-compliance context is special for several
reasons. For instance, it may be argued that (i) this is an area of norm obedience where rational
decision-making is most likely, (ii) there are no payoﬀ interdependencies among participants,
and (iii) tax enforcement is not as loaded with social meaning as compared to other incentive
systems (see, e.g., Franzoni 2009).1 These facets of the setup help us to keep other aspects
out of the decision-making context in order to fully focus on the potential path dependence of
compliance behavior.
In our laboratory setting, there are 20 rounds. In each round individuals ﬁrst earn gross
income in a real-eﬀort task. Next, participants are asked to report their gross income, knowing
that reported income is subject to an income tax and that any tax evasion may be detected and,
in the case of detection, will be penalized. Our treatment variable is the penalty multiplier,
which transforms evaded taxes into the penalty level payable upon detection. The level of the
penalty multiplier may be either high or low. In terms of expected income it always pays oﬀ
for the participants to declare an income of zero, irrespective of the treatment.
1It has been established that positive and negative incentives may have subtle, counterintuitive eﬀects since
they can, for instance, signal a lack of trust (see, e.g., Bowles 2008).
2The results suggest that tax compliance is path dependent. Individuals who had a high
penalty multiplier in rounds 1-10 and a low penalty multiplier in rounds 11-20, declare a higher
share of income in rounds 11-20 than individuals having had a low penalty multiplier in all
20 rounds. Similarly, individuals who had a low penalty multiplier in rounds 1-10 and a high
penalty multiplier in rounds 11-20, tend to declare a lower share of income in rounds 11-20
than individuals having been assigned a high penalty multiplier for all 20 rounds.
Our evidence suggests that experience with a law enforcement system aﬀects compliance
decisions. Therefore, personal history must be taken into account when determining optimal
government policy. These diﬀerent experiences imply heterogeneity among agents and thus
tend to reduce attainable welfare levels if government policy cannot be made contingent on
individual experiences. There are very important practical circumstances in which our results
are relevant. For example, there are many areas of the law in which the European Union seeks to
harmonize national legal frameworks. Environmental crimes are a case in point. There are large
diﬀerences between the criminal sanctions provided for environmental oﬀenses in the member
states. Directive 2008/99/EC on the protection of the environment through criminal law seeks
to redress this. Given, however, that compliance with the law may be path dependent, there
is little reason to expect that individual behavior in countries whose legal rules were diﬀerent
before the harmonization will rapidly converge as a result of legal harmonization. In a similar
vein, immigrants experience diﬀerent institutions and regulations in their home country before
migrating, and thus may respond diﬀerently to institutions than natives do. Finally, we refer to
an example outside of the context of legal system incentives: the possibility of path dependence
is relevant to incentive systems in ﬁrms, since the present employees of the ﬁrm often have
diﬀering previous employers, and diﬀerent employers imply diﬀering incentive systems.
The paper at hand analyzes the path dependence of the decision concerning compliance
with a legal norm and for which some related work can be found in the literature. The decision
to undertake a criminal act is often inﬂuenced by the level of human capital, and thus by
decisions made in the past (see, e.g., Lochner 2010). Similarly, it may be that the privately
optimal income declaration at present is dependent on declarations in the past, for example,
because detection by tax authorities in the current round may uncover tax evasion in past
rounds (see, e.g., Baumann and Friehe 2010). However, in our context, it is parameters of
the past that inﬂuence the norm compliance decision in the present. There are also other
studies which analyze individual tax compliance in the lab. For instance, Alm et al. (2009)
3test repercussions of diﬀerent types of enforcement information dissemination, Alm and McKee
(2006) discuss the consequences of audit certainty, and Alm et al. (1995) are interested in
social norm eﬀects on individual compliance.2 However, whether present individual compliance
is aﬀected by past enforcement has, to the best of our knowledge, not been dealt with as such
in the literature.
The structure of the article is as follows. In Section 2, we present the experimental design
and procedures. The behavioral hypotheses are laid out in Section 3, before discussing the
experimental results in Section 4. Section 5 concludes the study.
2 Experimental design and procedures
2.1 Experimental design
The experiment lasted 20 rounds, t =1 ,...,20.3 There were three stages in a round. In Stage 1,
participants could earn gross income It by performing a real-eﬀort, computer-based task. The
earnings task required subjects to ﬁnd a number in a 12 by 12 matrix. Each cell of the matrix
contained a number drawn randomly out of the set of natural numbers {1,...,9}. To earn
points, participants had to state the number in row x and column y, x, y ∈ {1,...,12}. After
they stated the correct number, participants obtained 10 points and got a new combination of
row and column numbers. An incorrect number prompted an error message which called for
another try. This earnings task lasted 45 seconds. In Stage 2, participants were informed via the
computer of their gross round income. They were instructed to make an income declaration
St ≤ It, knowing that a tax rate of τ = .3 was applied to declared income, implying a tax
payment of τSt. In Stage 3, the ﬁnal stage in a round, it was randomly determined whether
the income declaration was audited. The audit probability p was equal to .1. Detected tax
evasion, i.e., if there was an audit and It − St > 0 held, led to a penalty of τ(It − St)γt, where
τ(It − St) is the tax evaded and γt is the penalty multiplier in round t (Yitzhaki 1974).4 The
2For recent surveys on tax compliance, see Franzoni (2009) and Slemrod (2007).
3Our experimental design is similar to that used by Alm et al. (2009).
4The round income of a punished subject could be negative. In that case, losses were oﬀset against gains
in earlier rounds. Furthermore, participants were given an initial endowment of 240 points for compensation of
potential losses in initial rounds.
4written instructions and information presented on the computer screens during the experiment
used a taxation vocabulary, with phrases such as “income”, “tax declaration”, “tax evasion”,
and “penalty payment”. In this way, we made sure that individuals were aware of the fact that
tax honesty, i.e., It = St, was expected. The penalty multiplier γt was the treatment variable
and was equal to either 4 or 8. It stayed constant for rounds 1-10 and 11-20 in all treatments.
Thus, we may denote γ1−10 (γ11−20) as the penalty multiplier applying in the ﬁrst (second) ten
rounds. The experimental design consists of 4 treatments (see Table 1). Treatments 4-4 and
8-8 had the same penalty multiplier throughout all 20 rounds. In treatments 4-8 and 8-4, it
changed after 10 rounds.
Treatment γ1−10 γ11−20 Subjects
4-4 4 4 33
8-4 8 4 30
4-8 4 8 31
8-8 8 8 31
Table 1: Number of subjects (= number of independent observations) per treatment.
All participants were instructed at the beginning of the experiment about the possibility
of a change in the rules after 10 rounds. Before the start of round 11, all subjects received a
message on their computer screen, saying either that the penalty multiplier would change to
another level or that the rules of the experiment, including the level of the penalty multiplier,
would remain the same. Only after showing recognition of this information by clicking a button,
was round 11 started. At the end of each round, participants were informed of their resultant
income, whether an audit of their income declaration took place, and about the size of any taxes
or penalties paid. Participants did not obtain information about other participants’ behavior.
2.2 Experimental procedures
The experiment was computerized using z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007). A total of 125 students
from various disciplines took part in at most one of the four treatments. They were recruited
via ORSEE (Greiner 2004). The experiment took place in the Lakelab, the laboratory for
experimental economics at the University of Konstanz, in May 2010. Sessions lasted less than
90 minutes. The experimental currency was points, with 120 points converted into 1 Euro after
5the experiment. On average, participants earned 16.5 Euros in the experiment. The protocol
before the start of the experiment was as follows: Subjects ﬁrst received written instructions for
participating in the experiment, and then had to answer control questions which were shown on
their computer screen. The experiment started only after all subjects had answered the control
questions correctly. After the main experiment, we elicited participants’ attitudes toward risk
using the Holt and Laury (2002) procedure. At the end of the session, the participants were
asked to complete a questionnaire.
3 Behavioral hypotheses
Considering the subject’s problem in Stage 2 of a given round t (i.e., taking income as given)
we may argue that the participant seeks to
max
St
Et = pU(A) + (1 − p)U(N) (1)
where p is the audit probability, U represents the utility function, A = It − τSt − τ(It − St)γt
is the income level in the audit state of the world, and N = It − τSt is the income level in the
no audit state of the world. For a given level of income, expected utility responds to a change
in St according to
dEt
dSt
= τ [(γt − 1)pU
￿(A) − (1 − p)U
￿(N)]. (2)
An increase in the level of declared income increases (decreases) utility in the (no) audit state of
the world. Corner solutions may arise for speciﬁc combinations of tax enforcement parameters
and the tax rate (see, e.g., Allingham and Sandmo 1972). Assuming an interior solution, i.e.,
that (2) is equal to zero, makes it possible to derive the way in which the privately optimal
declaration S∗










￿(A) − τ(γt − 1)(It − St)U
￿￿(A)} (3)
which is greater than zero as long as U￿ > 0 and U￿￿ < 0 (i.e., for risk-averse participants). This
directly leads to our ﬁrst hypothesis:
H1: A higher penalty multiplier induces a higher level of declared income.
The above formal considerations make use of enforcement parameters of relevance in round
6t and do not incorporate enforcement parameters which were applicable in past rounds but
are no longer relevant for payoﬀs. This approach is in line with the intuitive idea that, to
direct behavior, the policy maker needs to adequately manipulate individual marginal beneﬁts
and costs. However, observations in areas other than tax compliance lend support to our idea
that past enforcement parameters are in fact not irrelevant for decision-making in the present
(see, e.g., Liebowitz and Margolis 1995). This potential relevance is of central interest in this
study. Participants invest conscious eﬀort into solving the problem given the initial penalty
multiplier. This basis is, we hypothesize, too internalized to lose its force once one parameter of
the set of enforcement parameters is changed. Our design makes it possible to inquire into the
consequences of enforcement information lingering in the heads of participants. It is reasonable
to expect that present behavior will to some extent be guided by present enforcement para-
meters, but can also to some extent be driven by past enforcement parameters. Speciﬁcally,
we construct the following hypotheses concerning responses to changes in the penalty multiplier:
H2: Individuals with penalty multipliers γ1−10 = 8 and γ11−20 = 4 declare more income in
rounds 11-20 than individuals with penalty multipliers γ1−10 = γ11−20 = 4.
H3: Individuals with penalty multipliers γ1−10 = 4 and γ11−20 = 8 declare less income in
rounds 11-20 than individuals with penalty multipliers γ1−10 = γ11−20 = 8.
4 Experimental results
Figure 1 summarizes our experimental evidence. It shows declared income divided gross income
averaged over the subjects in each treatment in round t, t =1 ,...,20. Tax declaration in
rounds 1-10 is signiﬁcantly lower if the penalty multiplier is γ1−10 = 4 instead of γ1−10 =8
(Wilcoxon rank sum test, two-sided, p-value < .01). This suggests that subjects respond to
the diﬀerent penalty multipliers in the way predicted by our formal considerations in Section
3.5 For the treatments with a change in the penalty multiplier, we ﬁnd a strongly signiﬁcant
upward (downward) shift in declaration rates in 4-8 (8-4) between the ﬁrst and the second
5Note that there is no statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerence between the income declarations in the two treatments














Figure 1: Average tax declaration
halves of the experiment.6 For the treatments without a change in the penalty multiplier (i.e.,
treatments 4-4 and 8-8) we ﬁnd that declaration rates remain constant over time.7
Result 1 A higher penalty multiplier induces a higher level of declared income.
While participants’ income declaration rates respond strongly to the diﬀerent levels of the
penalty multiplier, there is no such variation in observed eﬀort levels. In making this claim, we
have taken the number of correct answers in a given round to be a good proxy for participants’
eﬀort (see Figure 2). There is a clear upward trend in the number of correct answers, indicating
learning in identifying numbers in the matrix. However, the average number of correct answers
is not statistically diﬀerent across treatments with γ1−10 = 4 and γ1−10 = 8 (p-value = .3303).8
Our conclusion is that eﬀort incentives are not aﬀected by the level of the penalty multiplier.
6We tested the average income declaration rate in rounds 1-10 against that in rounds 11-20 using a two-sided
Wilcoxon signed rank test, and obtained p-values < .01 for both treatments.
7The p-values are equal to .5235 for 4-4 and .8746 for 8-8.














Figure 2: Average number of correct answers
Path dependence of declaration rates
Our central interest is with the potential path dependence of tax compliance. In exploring this
issue, we have included in this study the treatments 4-8 and 8-4 in which the penalty multiplier
changes after 10 rounds. Since participants in treatment 4-4 and participants in treatment 8-4
faced the same material payoﬀs in rounds 11-20, the standard argument would be that income
declaration rates of the respective groups should be indistinguishable. Similarly, the fact that
participants in treatment 8-8 and participants in treatment 4-8 faced the same enforcement
parameters in rounds 11-20 should imply similar tax compliance choices by the respective sub-
jects. However, Figure 3 illustrates that this is not the way decision-making actually took place.
In rounds 11-20, participants in treatment 8-4 declare more than participants in treatment 4-4.
Similarly, participants in treatment 4-8 declare less than participants in treatment 8-8. Actu-
ally, in treatment 8-4, income declaration rates in rounds 11-20 remained signiﬁcantly above
those in treatment 4-4 (Wilcoxon rank sum test, two-sided, p-value < .1). Comparing treat-
ment 4-8 and treatment 8-8, we obtain exactly the same eﬀect (p-value < .1). This supports
the conclusion that current behavior is guided by current enforcement parameters, but is at





















Figure 3: Average income declaration rate in the ﬁrst and second halves of the experiment
behavior of participants whose penalty multiplier has been changed after 10 rounds falls into
“middle ground” and can easily be diﬀerentiated from behavior of participants who had the
same penalty multiplier in rounds 11-20 but had not experienced a change in its level.9
When comparing the income declarations of participants in treatments with the same initial
penalty multiplier γ1−10, we ﬁnd further support for the path dependence of tax compliance.
The diﬀerence between the income declarations of participants in treatment 4-4 (8-8) and
subjects in treatment 4-8 (8-4) in rounds 11-20 is not statistically signiﬁcant (two-sided tests,
p-value (4-4 vs. 4-8) = .1323, p-value (8-4 vs. 8-8) = .1335). Stated diﬀerently, behavior by
participants in treatment 4-8 in rounds 11-20 is more similar to behavior by participants in
treatment 4-4 than to behavior by participants in treatment 8-8. Analogously, participants
9We carefully ensured that participants recognized the message informing about the change in the level
of the penalty multiplier. First, we announced in the instructions that they would receive new information
about the rules of the game after round 10. In addition, they had to click a button after reading this new
information before round 11 started. In the data, it shows that these measures were suﬃcient to draw the
subjects’ attention to the change. Declaration rates indeed strongly react in round 11 in both treatments 8-4
and 4-8 moving towards the levels of their companion treatments 4-4 and 8-8, respectively. Comparing only the
declaration rates in round 11, we ﬁnd no diﬀerence in income declarations, neither between 8-4 and 4-4 (p-value
= .3669) nor between 4-8 and 8-8 (p-value = .9761). Rather, path dependence appears to have manifested in
later rounds.
10in treatment 8-4 behave more similar to participants in treatment 8-8 than to participants in
treatment 4-4 in rounds 11-20.
Result 2 Individuals with penalty multipliers γ1−10 =8and γ11−20 =4declare more income
in rounds 11-20 than individuals with penalty multipliers γ1−10 = γ11−20 =4 .
Result 3 Individuals with penalty multipliers γ1−10 =4and γ11−20 =8declare less income in
rounds 11-20 than individuals with penalty multipliers γ1−10 = γ11−20 =8 .
As a robustness check of our central ﬁnding, we regress the share of income St/It which is
declared in round t on a set of explanatory variables (see Table 2). The explanatory variables
include two dummy variables for the value of the penalty multipliers in the ﬁrst and the second
half of the 20 rounds, respectively, controlling for the main treatment eﬀects. These dummy
variables take a value one if the penalty multiplier is high (γ = 8), and zero if it is low (γ = 4).
Furthermore, punisht−1 is a dummy variable indicating whether or not a subject was punished
in the previous round. We restrict our regression to rounds 12-20 where no more changes in the
penalty multiplier occur. Round 11 is thus not included in the regression. The lagged dummy
variable punisht−1 would otherwise cause behavior from round 10 (before the change in the
penalty multiplier) to enter the regression. The index round accordingly ranges from 12 to 20.
As a control, Table 2 also contains the results of a regression including round 11. The variable
incomet measures the gross income generated in round t. We use gross income instead of net
income as a control variable for potential wealth eﬀects because gross income enters the tax
declaration problem in Stage 2 as an exogenous variable. The variables male and religious use
self-stated answers from the post-experimental questionnaire. The former is a gender dummy
variable equal to one for men and zero for women. The latter can take the values 0, .25, .75,
and 1, depending on whether participants categorize themselves as “not religious”, “rather not
religious”, “rather religious” or “religious”. Finally, riskaversion represents the number of
risk-averse choices in the Holt and Laury (2002) procedure.
Table 2 summarizes the regression results. They conﬁrm the lasting eﬀect of the penalty
multiplier γ1−10. Past experience with a high penalty multiplier, i.e., with γ1−10 = 8, sig-
niﬁcantly increases the average declaration, which is qualitatively similar to the eﬀect of the
present penalty multiplier γ11−20 = 8.
11St/It Rounds 12-20 Rounds 11-20
γ1−10 = 8 .1525** .1547** .1316** .1410** .1431** .1214**
(.0624) (.0606) (.0583) (.0615) (.0599) (.0577)
γ11−20 = 8 .1131* .1139* .1324** .1197* .1201** .1382**
(.0625) (.0608) (.0583) (.0615) (.0602) (.0578)
punisht−1 -.2628*** -.2550*** -.2396*** -.2369***
(.0382) (.0363) (.0365) (.0350)
incomet .0008 .0011 .0007 .0010
(.0011) (.0011) (.0011) (.0010)
round .0029 .0023 .0026 .0021







constant .2043*** .1025 -.1785 .2051*** .1174 -.1369
(.0519) (.0977) (.1342) (.0503) (.0885) (.1300)
R2 .0524 .0843 .1295 .0501 .0770 .1175
Table 2: Regression coeﬃcients: % income declaration. Standard errors in brackets. ***
denotes signiﬁcance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level. Standard errors
are clustered by subject.
12Being punished has a negative and signiﬁcant eﬀect on future income declaration. This
eﬀect might be due to some participants’ lack of understanding of the independence of con-
trol probabilities across rounds.10 In fact, some participants stated in the post-experimental
questionnaire that they perceived the risk of being controlled as smaller than usual after a
control.11
The variables income and time have no signiﬁcant eﬀect on the level of income declaration
while risk aversion signiﬁcantly increases tax honesty in our experiment. The data does not
conﬁrm a statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect of gender or religiosity on declaration behavior. We,
thus, cannot conﬁrm previous ﬁndings of the empirical tax compliance literature (see, e.g.,
Torgler 2007) that people who call themselves religious are more tax honest than others.
Heterogeneity
Figure 4 gives information about the share of subjects who have an average declaration in
rounds 1-10 of a given magnitude. For instance, gathering participants in treatments 4-4 and
4-8, we ﬁnd that 24 out of 63 subjects (38%) declare no income, and only one participant
declares total income in all ten rounds. In contrast, in rounds 1-10 only 7 out of 60 subjects
(12%) in treatments 8-4 and 8-8 declare no income while 8 declare at least 90 and up to 100%.
Figure 5 shows how subjects with diﬀerent declaration inclinations in rounds 1-10 change
their behavior in rounds 11-20. To simplify the illustration, we cluster subjects into the three
groups of low, medium, and high declarers, given their average income declaration in rounds 1-
10. The groups are deﬁned such that low declarers declare up to 10% of their income in rounds
1-10, whereas high declarers declare at least 90%. Subjects with declaration rates between 10
and 90% in rounds 1-10 are denominated medium declarers. Here we see that the treatment
eﬀects in 4-8 and 8-4 result from reactions of participants from diﬀerent groups. In 8-4, the
decrease in tax honesty is a consequence of a behavioral adaption of both medium and high
declarers. In 4-8, some low declarers turn into medium, and some into high, declarers after the
10For similar evidence, see Bruttel and Kamecke (2010).
11We asked the question ’Did you change your behavior after being controlled and if so, how?’ to 81 of our
125 subjects. 9 participants out of these 81 responded something like “the probability of another control is
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Figure 4: Distribution of income declaration rates in rounds 1-10
increase in the penalty multiplier. In addition, some medium declarers declare almost all of
their income in rounds 11-20. The behavior in 8-8 is stable since only few subjects declare a
notably diﬀerent income share in rounds 11-20 compared to rounds 1-10. In 4-4, there are more
changes in individual declaration behavior while the average declaration rate over all subjects
in this treatment remains stable.
Discussion of results
There are diﬀerent mechanisms which may be decisive for the observed path dependence. For
instance, it has to be noted that path dependence of tax compliance is related to the concept
labeled anchoring (see, e.g., Ariely et al. 2003, Stewart 2009). An anchor is commonly deﬁned
to be completely irrelevant to the task at hand, but may still inﬂuence judgment or behavior.
Most prominently, Tversky and Kahneman (1974) spun a wheel of fortune with numbers ranging
from 0 to 100, asked subjects whether the number of African nations in the UN was greater or
less than that number, and then requested subjects to estimate the actual number of African
nations. These estimates were signiﬁcantly related to the number spun on the wheel (the
anchor). Path dependence in tax compliance is created by factors which in fact used to inﬂuence
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Figure 5: Declaration behavior of low, medium and high declarers from rounds 1-10 in rounds
11-20.
path dependence is diﬀerent from anchoring. Still, it is possible that past decisions regarding
tax compliance function as an anchor for present decisions.
The behavior may also be explained by taking conformity-seeking behavior or compliance
to a social norm into account. Individuals may prefer to behave as they think others do
(conformity) or they may feel obliged to behave in a certain way (social norm). With regard to
the latter, it is conceivable that a norm is introduced simply by having either mild or drastic
penalties for tax evasion (see, e.g., Cooter 1998). However, there are no payoﬀ interdependencies
in our setup, whereas this is usually the case in studies concerning social norms (see, e.g., Alm
et al. 1999). Conformity-seeking behavior is complicated by the fact that individuals do not
know how others behave, but they nonetheless form beliefs about others’ decisions. The post-
experimental questionnaire asked subjects to state the expected average declaration rate of
other participants. Subjects with the low penalty multiplier in rounds 1-10 stated lower beliefs
(35.61% in 4-4 and 35.48% in 4-8) than those with the high penalty multiplier (47.00% in 8-4 and
50.97% in 8-8). The diﬀerence between the expected declaration rate of subjects with γ1−10 =4
and with γ1−10 = 8 is indeed highly signiﬁcant (p-value < .01). In contrast, there is virtually
15no diﬀerence between the expected declaration rates of subjects with γ11−20 = 4 and those
with γ11−20 = 8 (p-value = .5317). Thus, beliefs about others’ compliance behavior mirror the
main treatment eﬀect. Individual declaration rates and beliefs about others’ declarations have
a correlation coeﬃcient of .5756. This correlation gives some support to the idea that subjects
condition their tax declaration on their belief about the honesty of others. Such conditioning
has been established in other studies of tax compliance (see Frey and Torgler 2007). In addition,
however, to the discussed eﬀects, we note that a consensus eﬀect (see Ross et al. 1977) could
also explain this similarity between behavior and beliefs stated ex post.
Finally, our data may be interpreted as resulting from the imperfect adaptation to changes
in the decision problem. For participants in treatments 4-8 and 8-4, a key parameter changed
after ten rounds. This requires that subjects consider how individually optimal behavior needs
to adapt in response to this change. However, this re-optimization requires eﬀort, in particular
because the decision problem involves a choice in the presence of risk. Participants invested
notable conscious eﬀort into solving their initial tax compliance problem in the ﬁrst ten rounds,
based on the penalty multiplier γ1−10 contained in the instructions and in the control questions.
In contrast, the change in the level of the penalty multiplier after round 10 was recognized “in
passing”, without much extra time for calculating optimal decisions anew. These combined
aspects could lead to a strong argument for reverting to the level of the declaration rate which
used to be perceived as optimal given the original statement of the problem, instead of under-
taking a true re-optimization.
5 Conclusion
We establish that factors having no impact on current payoﬀs may still contribute to deter-
mining individual choices. In order to establish this point, we provide experimental evidence
showing that past enforcement parameters aﬀect present tax compliance behavior. Although
the penalty for tax evasion applicable in past rounds is not relevant for current payoﬀs, indi-
viduals who were used to a high penalty declared a higher share of income, given a low level of
the penalty, than individuals who continuously had a low penalty. The observed choices sug-
gest that indeed both past and present enforcement parameters have an inﬂuence on present
individual behavior. This strongly suggests that norm compliance in the tax realm is path
dependent.
16Our ﬁndings have important policy implications. Some of these, for example with respect
to EU harmonization, were elaborated on before. The ﬁndings concerning round 11 of the
experiment also merit discussion in this context. Observing something like the strong initial
reaction to the change in the penalty level in our experiment may mislead policy makers eval-
uating the eﬀectiveness of their policy changes. Behavioral adaptations in the short run do not
necessarily provide convincing evidence for the eﬀectiveness of a policy change. Our data shows
that individuals may fall back into past decision patterns relatively quickly. In this context, our
results suggest that policy makers need to invest in ensuring that individuals aﬀected by the
policy change actually concern themselves with its repercussions in determining their optimal
behavior.
Appendix: Instructions for treatments with γ1−10 =4
The following gives the translations of the German instructions for treatments 4-8 and 4-4.
Instructions for the other treatments were identical except for the parts concerning the third
stage.
General instructions:
Thank you for participating in this experiment.
From now on, please remain seated and do not talk to other participants. These instructions
are identical for all participants. Please read them carefully. If you have a question regarding
the experiment, please raise your hand. We will come to you to help.
This experiment will last 20 rounds. Each round comprises a sequence of decisions and
events. There are three stages in each round, which will be described below. There may be
a change in your decision problem after 10 rounds. This (possibly varied) decision problem
will be valid for the remaining 10 rounds. Your payment in this experiment depends on your
decisions and luck, but not on other participants’ decisions.
Your gains and losses are counted in points during the experiment. After the experiment,
all points will be added up and you will receive 1 Euro cash for each 120 points you scored in
17the experiment. In addition, you receive an initial endowment of 240 points.
Before the experiment starts, we will ask you some control questions. This is to ensure that
all participants understand the instructions. Your answers to these questions do not inﬂuence
your ﬁnal payment.
After the main experiment, there will be a lottery experiment. You will receive the instruc-
tions for this second part of the experiment on your computer screen after the end of the ﬁrst
part.
Detailed description of one round:
In this experiment, you will go through a series of decisions and events in each round. One
round consists of three stages:
1) Earnings task:
In the ﬁrst stage, you can earn points. You need to ﬁnd numbers in a matrix with 12
columns and 12 rows. You have 45 seconds to ﬁnd as many numbers as possible. You receive
10 points for each correct number. The screen of this stage looks as follows:
182) Tax declaration:
In the second stage, you must declare your income (in points). Your declared income may
be smaller than your actual income, but not larger. Declared income is subject to an income
tax of 30%. If you, for example, have a gross income of 20 points and declare an income of 12
points, you have to pay 3.6 points in taxes.
Gross income Declared income Taxes paid
20 12 3.6
Table 3: Example with gross income = 20 and declared income = 12.
The tax declaration screen is shown in the following ﬁgure:
Enter your declared income into the indicated ﬁeld. Your declared income may be smaller
than or equal to the actual income you earned in this round. Clicking on “calculate” shows
you both how many points would be subtracted as taxes and what your net income would be
in this round, if that amount were your declared income. Clicking on “calculate” has no other
consequence besides providing you this information. Your entry is binding only after you click
“submit income”.
3) Tax audit:
19In the third stage, your tax declaration is audited with a probability of 10%. If you did
not declare all of your income in Stage 2 and are controlled, there will be a penalty amounting
to the evaded taxes multiplied by the penalty multiplier four. The following tables show one
example with and one without tax audit.
Gross income Declared income Taxes paid Taxes not paid Points subtracted Net income
20 12 3.6 2.4 9.6 6.8
Table 4: Example with income > declaration and tax audit
Gross income Declared income Taxes paid Taxes not paid Points subtracted Net income
20 12 3.6 2.4 0 16.4
Table 5: Example with income > declaration with no tax audit
If you earned 20 points in the ﬁrst stage and declared 12 points in the second stage, you
will receive a net income of 6.8 points if your tax declaration is controlled (10% probability)
and 16.4 points in the case that it is not (90% probability).
At the end of each round you will be informed about:
• your round income in points,
• your taxes paid in points,
• whether you have been controlled or not, and
• your net income after deduction of taxes and a potential penalty due to tax evasion.
Please ﬁll out the short questionnaire after the experiment. After you have done so, you
will be paid your net income in cash (1 Euro per 120 points).
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